ray jackendoff, language, consciousness, culture: essays on mental structure. introduction according to a familiar research framework, we can explain various aspects of cognition and behavior by functionally characterizing the mind/brain in terms of computations over structures. Leading questions then include: what are these structures and computations what are the primitives, and how are they combined and processed , how are they acquired are any innate or innately constrained , how are they neurally realized, and what is their evolutionary history? ray jackendoff has been among the most creative and wide ranging contributors to this enterprise. In particular, he has advocated applying the methods and insights of linguistics to less well trodden cognitive domains, such as musical cognition and the interface of language and perception while demanding as well that linguists attend more to the constraints imposed on their own theorizing by results in neighboring fields. 1 jackendoff's most recent book continues these efforts, providing in particular his most sustained discussion of the mental structures implicated in social cognition. Jackendoff excels at weaving together lucid overviews, suggestive large scale connections, and intriguing specific hypotheses and observations.

2 in what follows, i summarize its contents and then raise some questions concerning jackendoff's views on consciousness and on theory of mind. The first part of language, consciousness, culture comprises jackendoff's augmented 2003 jean nicod lectures and provides a wide lens view of various cognitive domains. Chapter 1 lays out the computational framework and argues that the mind is modular in that it utilizes a variety of distinct, incompatible structural formats. Jackendoffian modules individuated, but also prima facie isolated, by their proprietary structural formats interact in virtue of interfaces that establish cross modular correlations among structures. Some details are developed in chapter 2 a précis of jackendoff 2002 with respect to phonology, syntax, and semantics, modules implicated in linguistic competence. Their structures differ not just in their constituents, but also in their combinatorial principles e.g. Syllabic structure, unlike syntactic and conceptual semantic structure, is hierarchical but not recursive.

Indeed, a central claim of chapter 2 is that, contrary to mainstream generative linguistics' assumption that syntax alone supplies generative principles, linguistic competence has a parallel architecture. The modules interface via triples of cross indexed phonological, syntactic, and conceptual structures stored in long term memory. These include both specific lexical entries and more abstract schemata rules , which differ, on jackendoff's view, only in that the latter contain variables that the former have filled in. Jackendoff argues inter alia that the parallel architecture provides a better mesh with accounts of linguistic processing, a compelling account of idioms and syntactic nuts, and consistency with an incremental evolutionary path to language. Chapter 3 asks after the functional correlates of consciousness, specifically with respect to consciousness of language. On jackendoff's view, the mental structures correlated with consciousness have two kinds of constituents: content features and valuation features.

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The content features of linguistic experience mostly mirror auditory images of phonological structure. Imaginings and ±self initiated in the case of language, experienced as your own speech vs. Jackendoff's intermediate level hypothesis maintains that these structures correspond to where top down processing first comes into play and attention is attracted and anchored. Because attention affects resource allocation, consciousness of language enhances thought: the attention drawn to a phonological structure yields a greater allocation of resources to its associated conceptual structure as well, leading to greater inferential processing. Chapter 4 speculates on the mental structures involved in complex actions, with special attention to shaking hands and making coffee. Jackendoff pursues analogies with linguistic competence, arguing, for instance, that these structures exhibit hierarchical complexity indeed, recursive structure, contrary to hauser, chomsky, and fitch's 2002 claim that language is unique among human cognitive capacities in this regard. He claims moreover that, as with language, the principles that constrain the construction of these structures operate over a vast lexicon of actions stored in long term memory, as well as stored action schemata whose variables can be fleshed out on line as context requires perhaps thus avoiding problems that bedeviled frames and scripts of old.

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It retains its uniqueness and its modularity in virtue of its proprietary structural formats and its particular functional role. Chapter 5 advocates a mentalist approach to social cognition by drawing parallels with familiar considerations concerning language. The unlimited number of understandable social situations suggests a combinatorial rule system only partly available to consciousness.

That we acquire social competence from imperfect evidence and receive explicit instruction only about the consciously accessible rules suggests unlearned resources for social learning, innate and perhaps in part specific to social cognition. Jackendoff argues further that linguistics has a particular interest and role in the study of social cognition. First, a number of important linguistic issues involve social terms: the difference between a request and an order, for example, invokes social dominance. Second, linguistic evidence can provide insights into the conceptual structures involved in social cognition. After outlining how we conceptualize stable social relations kinship, alliances, dominance hierarchies, and groups as well as more evanescent relations, jackendoff discusses rules and other normative principles, arguing inter alia that systems of norms in general offer a more promising object of study than moral principles in particular. With chapter 5 in place, the stage is set for the book's second part, which mostly provides detailed examinations of specific conceptual structures implicated in social cognition.

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Chapter 6 argues that the syntactic distribution of perception verbs requires a basic constituent in conceptual structure 'x exp y' glossed as 'x experiences y' that divides these verbs into those that imply a theory of mind 'sees' and those that do not 'looks at'. Theory of mind, on jackendoff's view, does not constitute a distinct module but rather amounts to the possession of particular resources in the conceptual module. Chapter 7 analyzes how we use psychological and evaluative predicates to frame objective and subjective claims 'problem p isn't interesting' vs. The objective case involves a conceptual constituent 'ya' for a generic person, introduced in the previous chapter's discussion of experience verbs without overt experiencers 'the stew tastes wonderful'.

Chapter 8 takes up our conceptualization of intentional action and the linguistic expression of intention. It's argued that 'intend' belongs to a class of actional attitude verbs restricted to self initiated, non past directed actions. Chapter 9 distinguishes eight kinds of conceptualized value and discusses which ontological categories they apply to, their objective and subjective linguistic expression, and their varying conceptual roles. The value system is characterized as an abstract, multi dimensional calculating system that guides action albeit typically in a quick and intuitive fashion.

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Drawing upon chapter 8's discussion of joint intentions, it distinguishes freely chosen reciprocity including reciprocal altruism and agreed upon exchange. Chapter 11 turns to the conceptualization of rights, obligations, and the authority to impose obligations. Rights are analyzed as a relation between an actor and an action obligations require as well someone to whom the actor is obligated.

3 along the way, jackendoff argues that the language used to characterize these domains terms of possession for rights, of constraining force for obligations does not support the hypothesis that these concepts arise from metaphorical extension rather, the rough association between independently existing conceptual clusters motivates the linguistic collocations. Finally, chapter 12 briefly speculates about which aspects of social cognition may be innate, which of those may be shared with other primates, and which may be specific to social cognition as opposed to part of a more general cognitive capacity. Beyond up dating jackendoff's views on a variety of topics, adds a distinctive perspective to the study of social cognition. The comparison with linguistics delineates a framework for the field, and the examination of how social judgments are linguistically expressed supplies a new source of evidence. If at points jackendoff raises more questions than he sometimes speculatively answers, he also sharpens those questions and indicates directions along which answers may be found. The book succeeds as well because it is so rich and thought provoking: quite a few of its brief asides could themselves form the basis of an interesting research program. I'll try to indicate this richness by raising a few questions about just two of the many topics touched on: consciousness and theory of mind.

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consciousness i'll remark on three aspects of jackendoff's views on consciousness: the intermediate level hypothesis, the impossibility of conscious thought, and the valuation feature ±self initiated. Jackendoff, recall, holds that the functional correlates of consciousness are intermediate level structures, where top down processing first comes into play and attention is attracted and anchored phonological structures in the case of linguistic experience. But prinz 2007 , following bisiach 1992 , argues that subliminal perception and neglect show that the occurrence of an intermediate level structure is not sufficient for consciousness. Jackendoff, however, while accepting that consciousness and attention have a close relation and that consciousness is necessary for attention, does not claim that attention is necessary for consciousness. If i understand him aright, at least some of his cases of fringe awareness would exhibit consciousness without attention.